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Abstract 
This paper uses EU and US biofuels policies to interrogate certain issues relating to the 
concept of policy failure. It utilises recent work classifying policy success, policy failure, and 
the space in between to explore how we might understand these ideas better in the context of 
policies designed to run over a set period of time, but which are designed to address problems 
which are long-term and ongoing – specifically energy security and climate change. A 
specific policy with specific targets defined over a specified time-period may be judged as 
success or failure. But insofar as any particular policy, under these circumstances, is intended 
first and foremost to be taking markets and market outcomes in a specific direction, the 
judgement of policy success or failure may need to be subordinated to considerations of how 
policy-makers are able to steer policy, putting it back on track if it veers off, accepting a 
slower speed of travel if initial targets are overly-ambitious. This ability to reflect on policy 
and to learn from experience may ultimately be crucial to defining the success or failure of 
‘policy’, over and above judgements made about ‘this particular policy’. 
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1. Introduction 
Notions of success, failure, recognising the difference and knowing how to respond have 
particular salience for public policy. Policies are intended to deliver specified outcomes, at a 
point in time or on an ongoing basis. Knowing when to determine if we have failure, and to 
consider policy reforms – be they minor tweaks or major changes – are key challenges facing 
policy-makers. An important recent contribution to the literature on policy failure is Howlett, 
2012, who examines multiple dimensions of policy failure. He also reproduces a useful 
definition of policy failure from the writing of Allan McConnell, as “a policy fails insofar as 
it does not achieve the goals that proponents set out to achieve and no longer receives support 
from them” (quoted in Howlett, 2012: 542). 
 
This immediately raises the question: when should a decision over success or failure be 
made? The temporal dimension of policy is central to the determination of policy success and 
failure. It is also central to the determination of whether policy change is required, when it is 
required, and what form and magnitude it should take. This, in turn, raises fundamental 
questions about the policy cycle – notably, if ‘evaluation’ is recognised as a distinct step in 
the policy cycle, does that mean that such a decision is only taken at one point in time? Or 
should we instead see the policy cycle as a wheel in perpetual motion, as a result of which 
‘evaluation’ of the progress of a policy is itself ongoing and continual? For a concise 
summary of the concept the policy cycle and its application, see Howlett et al., 2009: 10-14. 
 
Biofuels policies have multiplied in the last decade, as governments around the world seek 
responses to a range of pressures: greenhouse gas emissions and anthropogenic climate 
change; energy security; and concerns over rural and/or agricultural development. In this 
paper we focus on policy developments in the EU and US. In both, policy-makers have 
sought to expand significantly biofuels production and use in transport fuel in a relatively 
short period of time. These have, as their long term superordinate target, fully-functioning 
biofuels markets. Within this, timetables are set endogenously to plot out progress, quantified 
in terms of the scale of the biofuels market. Failure to attain the near-term goals does not 
necessarily undermine the general direction of travel, and thus helps such policy failures 
avoid becoming political failures. Indeed, it is not automatically the case that failure to 
deliver short term goals constitutes policy failure; instead, this may be a consequence of 
temporary and reversible policy disruption. 
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Given the newness of the superordinate policy goal defined for biofuels policies, they 
represent exploratory cases which have an experimentalist dimension, in which learning 
about how to line up market, policy and technological developments is at its core. 
Experimentalism requires tolerance of failure (or at least, less than total success). Built 
around EU and US biofuels policy cases, the present paper takes an inductive approach. 
These policies have set out, within a specified timeframe, to deliver specified increases in 
biofuels production and use. Two dimensions key to biofuels policies but not necessarily 
common in public policies are thus the enumerated targets and their various timeframes. The 
short-term targets represent points for monitoring progress, allowing for judgments whether 
the policy or the politics might be failing, or have failed. 
 
Late 2013/early 2014 is proving to be a critical time for biofuels policies and therefore an 
ideal time to be asking these questions. The current status of biofuels policies in both the EU 
and US is raising questions about whether or not the design and subsequent implementation 
dynamics of policy constitutes policy failure. In the EU, proposals for reform of the biofuels 
policy have been on the table for over a year. Attempts to conclude agreement on the reform 
in late 2013 failed and, with European Parliament elections in 2014, those proposals are not 
expected to be returned to until 2015. The main elements of this reform, it is argued below, 
represent responses to “problem worsening” (Howlett, 2012: 542); but, importantly, problem 
worsening arising endogenously, in particular in relation to the climate change driver of 
biofuels policy. Moreover, given the ‘salami slicing’ (Zahariadis, 2003: 15) approach to 
policy-making over some of the (politically) most challenging aspects of policy, the current 
reform proposals do not represent a critical juncture in policy, but can be seen essentially as 
part of the iterative development of policy. An interesting dimension to this is the extent to 
which the endogenous problem worsening is being caused or ameliorated by particular slices 
of salami being introduced into the policy over time. 
 
In the US, the current (and still uncertain) picture is rather different. The policy as set down 
in 2007 was more complete than the salami-sliced EU policy, with annual quantified targets 
for the volumes of different biofuels to be blended into the (fossil fuel-dominated) road 
transport fuel mix through to 2022. Persistent failure to deliver sufficient volumes of some 
types of biofuel has brought the policy into question. Significantly, however, the current state 
of the debate suggests that this failure, which can be identified as applying to specific parts of 
US biofuels policy, is potentially threatening the direction of travel of the entire policy. In 
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terms of McConnell’s definition of policy failure, quoted earlier, this raises a fundamental 
question over the extent to which US biofuels policy continues to have the support of key 
policy actors. An alternative reading is that the US case is heading for political failure in the 
absence of policy failure. Biofuels policies have therefore, in both jurisdictions, been subject 
to disruptions to the policy cycle. In the EU, some key disruptions have been essentially 
unexpected, whereas those in the US have, many would argue, been foreseeable and foreseen 
for some years. 
 
A further dimension of the empirical analysis presented here, draws on the literature of 
historical institutionalism – notably, the notion of ‘policy’ being more accurately represented 
as a matrix or nexus of multiple institutions and policy elements (see, inter alia, Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005; Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; with an application of these ideas in Ackrill and 
Kay, 2006). Thus a ‘policy’ consisting of multiple institutions, elements, and instruments, 
may experience different degrees of success/failure at different points in time. Hence the 
(deliberately grammatically questionable) wording of the title of this paper. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next Section we presents salient features of our biofuels 
policy case studies, with a brief introduction to the policies followed by a more in-depth 
exploration of key issues pertinent to the current paper. Section 3 highlights challenges faced 
by, and currently facing, our two cases; whilst, in keeping with the inductive approach 
adopted in this first version of the paper, Section 4 introduces some of the key concepts of the 
policy failure literature and uses this to consider whether biofuels policies in the EU and US 
are examples of policies that have succeeded, failed, or are work in progress. Section 5 offers 
some initial concluding thoughts. 
 
2. Biofuels Policies in the EU and US 
2.1 A Brief Introduction to the Basics of Biofuels Policies 
Biofuels are a form of renewable fuel. For current purposes, there are two variants – ethanol 
(derived from sugars and blended with petrol/gasoline) and biodiesel (derived from fats and 
blended with diesel). A further feature of biofuels, crucial for our subsequent analysis, is the 
distinction between conventional (or first generation) biofuels, and advanced biofuels. First 
generation biofuels are derived from feedstocks that can be used as food for humans. As a 
result, they create the potential for competition between fuel and food, and for land use (they 
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also could create competition for other resources, such as water, but this has not yet entered 
the biofuels debate in a significant way at the level of ideas and policies). 
 
Advanced biofuels are derived from non-food feedstocks. This avoids the potential fuel-food 
competition but, since some advanced biofuels are derived from feedstocks which require 
land specifically for their cultivation, these retain the possibility of competition for land. 
Second generation biofuel feedstocks include non-food biomass (for example the non-edible 
parts of grains such as the stover, as well as wood waste), but also certain grasses which are a 
cultivated crop in their own right. Second generation biofuels also include biodiesel derived 
from animal fats. We include in this category biodiesel derived from recycled used cooking 
fats and oils, as these too avoid competition with food. 
 
Beyond this are biofuels derived from algae, and biofuels derived from crops engineered for 
optimal performance as sources of biofuel. Both are referred to in the literature as third 
generation biofuels. Fourth generation biofuels are those which, it is hoped, will reduce the 
total amount of carbon, by storing (in their growth and in their conversion to biofuel) more 
carbon than they release. We note third and fourth generation biofuels for completeness – our 
principal focus in this paper is on the differences between first generation and advanced 
biofuels – for which second generation is a more than adequate exemplar. Currently, 
however, about 99% of biofuels produced globally are first generation. 
 
In the period since the millennium, the EU and US have developed their biofuels policies, 
turning what was a minor source of transport fuel into a central plank of their efforts to 
transform their energy matrices. Biofuels policies have three key drivers – promoting energy 
security, helping tackle climate change by reducing carbon dioxide emissions from transport 
and transport fuel, and promoting rural/agricultural development. All three drivers play a role 
in the discourse around both EU and US policy. That said, different arguments have been 
utilised at different times, and to different degrees, in each case. 
 
US policy, coming in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 2001, has been driven as a policy 
promoting energy security by reducing dependence on imported (Middle Eastern) oil. 
Alongside this has been a strong agricultural policy dimension, with an ethanol-promoting 
policy explicitly providing an outlet for corn, following changes to the requirements for 
oxygenates in gasoline in 2005. In the EU, the dominant driver in the policy discourse has 
6 
 
been climate change mitigation. Biofuels policy has direct antecedents in the international 
climate policy arena, in which the EU was particularly active from 1992 (at the Rio Earth 
Summit) as, led by the European Commission, it sought to recover from internal strife by 
identifying a policy area in which it could be a global leader (see, inter alia, Oberthür and 
Pallemaerts, 2010; Wurzel and Connelly, 2010). 
 
Whilst the political systems have notable differences, and drivers of biofuels policy varied in 
importance between the two cases, it is the case that both policy debates and, subsequently, 
the policies themselves, emerged at around the same time. In the EU, the 2003 Biofuels 
Directive laid down voluntary targets for the blending of biofuels into transport fuel; whilst, 
in the US, a mandatory Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was established in the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 (EU, 2003; US Senate and House of Representatives, 2005, respectively). 
 
These were relatively swiftly replaced by legislation that, at the time of writing, remain in 
place: the EU’s 2009 Renewable Energy Directive (RED) and the US 2007 Energy 
Independence and Security Act (EISA) (EU, 2009; US Senate and House of Representatives, 
2007, respectively). The RED moved the EU from a voluntary to a mandatory target for the 
blending of biofuels in transport fuel; and both RED and EISA increased considerably the 
targets for biofuels blending, looking to develop the markets well beyond their size at that 
time. The EU target is for biofuels to contribute (the vast majority of) a 10% share of 
renewable fuels in total transport fuels by 2020. The US target in the EISA is for transport 
fuel to include 36 billion gallons of biofuels by 2022. On initial projections this figure 
equated to between 20% and 25% of the total transport fuel mix. 
 
EU policy does not target specific types of biofuel, although any advanced biofuel, not 
derived from agricultural commodities, counts double towards the mandate. US policy, 
however, divides the 36 billion gallon mandate explicitly between different biofuels (see 
Table 1, below). By 2015, 15 billion gallons are mandated to come from conventional 
biofuels, the definition of which requires them to deliver at least a 20% reduction in 
Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emissions relative to fossil fuels. The advanced biofuel mandate 
rises to 21 billion gallons in 2022, of which at least 16 billion must come from cellulosic 
biofuels, delivering a 60% emissions-reduction. At least 1 billion must come from biomass-
based diesel delivering 50% reductions (as must non-cellulosic advanced ethanol). 
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Appendix Table: The US Renewable Fuel Standard (billion gallons) 
Year Conventional 
Total 
Advanced Biofuel 
o/w 
Cellulosic 
o/w Biomass-
based diesel 
o/w non-cellulosic 
advanced 
Total 
2008 9 9 
2009 10.5 0.6 0.5 0.1 11.1 
2010 12 0.95 0.1 0.65 0.2 12.95 
2011 12.6 1.35 0.25 0.8 0.3 13.95 
2012 13.2 2 0.5 1* 0.5 15.2 
2013 13.8 2.75 1 1 0.75 16.55 
2014 14.5 3.75 1.75 1 1 18.15 
2015 15 5.5 3 1 1.5 20.5 
2016 15 7.25 4.25 1 2 22.25 
2017 15 9 5.5 1 2.5 24 
2018 15 11 7 1 3 26 
2019 15 13 8.5 1 3.5 28 
2020 15 15 10.5 1 3.5 30 
2021 15 18 13.5 1 3.5 33 
2022 15 21 16 1 4 36 
Source: based on US Senate and House of Representatives, 2007. 
Note: * The EPA shall set each year a figure of at least 1 billion gallons. 
 
It should be noted that the RFS uses the term ‘advanced biofuel’ slightly differently to its 
more common meaning outlined earlier. The RFS definition is based on their GHG emissions 
reduction performance. Thus, for example, Brazilian sugarcane-ethanol is a first generation 
biofuel which, in the RFS, is classified as advanced because of its outstanding GHG 
emissions reduction capabilities. This point notwithstanding, it was anticipated that most of 
the biofuels utilised to satisfy this Federal target would be produced domestically. In the EU, 
however, interviews with senior Commission officials made it clear that it was understood 
clearly from the outset that EU policy would entail significant imports. 
 
In terms of the three drivers of biofuels policy, to the extent that biofuels substitute for fossil 
fuels, and (more or less) by definition diversify the source countries from which energy 
supplies are obtained, biofuels enhance energy security. Second, biofuels do provide an outlet 
for farmers selling their crops. Moreover, the production of biofuels from feedstocks will 
tend to be located near to agricultural areas. Thus, without getting diverted by semantic 
debates over the meaning of ‘rural development’ we can, very broadly, say that biofuels do 
deliver market opportunities and rural jobs. On the other hand, to the extent to biofuels utilise 
food commodities as feedstocks, and utilise land suitable for food production, this dimension 
of biofuels does raise questions about their side-effects, discussed further below. 
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With the third driver, there is much more uncertainty and debate. According to a saying we 
heard several times on fieldwork trips to Brazil, ‘there is no such thing as good biofuels and 
bad biofuels – only biofuels done well and biofuels done badly’. There is nothing intrinsically 
good or bad about biofuels. What matters is that every combination of feedstock type, 
location for growing, and technology pathway for conversion into biofuel delivers different 
GHG emissions performances. Referring to biofuels done well or done badly is not a 
statement about the motivations of biofuels producers, but merely a statement reflecting the 
truism that some biofuels deliver better GHG emissions reductions than others. 
 
When judging the success or failure of a policy, the policy itself will specify targets against 
which it can be judged. With biofuels policies, however, these three policy drivers provide an 
additional benchmark against which to judge performance. In this section we have identified 
briefly the key goals of biofuels policy. In the next sub-section, we identify key features of 
biofuels policies which might represent points of potential conflict and debate. It is these 
which, in Section 4, we analyse to see if either or both of our biofuels policy cases might be 
judged as failure, success, or merely challenges for policies which remain work-in-progress. 
 
2.2 Biofuels Policies – Identifying Key Policy Issues 
The RED and EISA established targets for biofuels blending through to 2020 and 2022, 
respectively. Moreover, in the US the RFS sets out annual targets – although, importantly (as 
we shall see), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has the power to amend those 
figures each year in line with expected production. Before looking at these figures in more 
detail, in order to put them in context an important aspect of policy in both of our cases needs 
to be introduced. Our fieldwork interviews in both Brussels and Washington DC (in 2010 and 
2011) revealed that policy-makers saw first generation biofuels as a ‘bridge technology’, 
establishing a market which is then developed and reinforced by expanding advanced 
biofuels production and use. 
 
Given political concerns over, in particular, energy security and climate change, initial 
legislative efforts (2003 in the EU, 2005 in the US, as detailed earlier) promoted ‘biofuels’, 
but with an implicit focus on first generation biofuels. First generation biofuels use available 
feedstocks, long-established technologies for processing into biofuels, and existing engine 
technologies to utilise the biofuels. Thus production could be brought on-stream relatively 
quickly and politicians are seen to be responding decisively to energy security and climate 
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change concerns. Meanwhile, policy-makers have been supporting companies in their 
research and development efforts towards advanced biofuels – not from first principles (most 
of the technologies, especially for second generation biofuels, are well-known), but in being 
able to achieve full commercialisation of those technologies. 
 
The importance of this is seen in the earlier description of biofuels, where first generation 
biofuels compete with food markets for feedstocks and for land-use. With second generation 
biofuels, whilst some land-use competition may remain (depending on the feedstock), there is 
no competition with food markets for feedstocks. In short, a successful transition from first to 
second generation biofuels will, of itself, help mitigate the potential downsides of first 
generation biofuels. As a result of this, biofuels policies in both cases have effectively 
bifurcated. This process is seen clearly in one of the main differences between the 2003 (EU) 
and 2005 (US) legislation on the one hand; and their replacements, the RED and EISA, on the 
other. With the latter, promotion of advanced biofuels is explicit – albeit in different ways in 
each case, as explained above. 
 
As a result of this policy bifurcation, policy-makers face significant challenges. They must 
tackle potential shortcomings in first generation biofuels, whilst maintaining the development 
of biofuels markets through those biofuels, at the same time delivering credible, sustained, 
support to, importantly, private business actors, who are the ones required to deliver on those 
policy goals. Given the uncertainty inherent in basing policy on undeveloped technology such 
a policy, in implementation, requires flexibility and adaptability. As explored below, 
disruption has also been felt as anti-biofuels groups put pressure on policy-makers, ostensibly 
because of the potential downsides of first generation biofuels but, given the role of these in 
establishing biofuels markets, with potential consequences for all biofuels. 
 
The consequences of this are seen most clearly in the structure and sequence of targets within 
the RFS (Table 1). This provides for expansion in biofuels production to be led by first 
generation (or ‘conventional’) ethanol up to 2015. This, in turn, will be dominated by 
domestically produced ethanol derived from corn. After 2015, with the volume of 
conventional ethanol now fixed, the expansion of total biofuels production up to 36 billion 
gallons in 2022 is to come from a variety of advanced biofuels. 
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This has not happened on the scale envisaged. Whilst production of biodiesel has developed 
expanded, and non-cellulosic biofuels (such as imported Brazilian sugarcane ethanol) have 
been brought to market, cellulosic ethanol has materialised in only modest volumes. Thus, for 
example, the first cellulosic ethanol target in the RFS, for 2010 (set at 100 million gallons) 
was, in the EPAs final rule for 2010, reduced to 6.5 million gallons (ethanol equivalent). For 
2011 the figures were 250 million gallons and 6 million gallons (ethanol equivalent), 
respectively; for 2012 the original figure of 500 million gallons (ethanol equivalent) was 
reduced to 10.45 million gallons (ethanol equivalent) but, after legal action was brought, the 
EPA set the 2012 figure at zero; and, for 2013, the original target of 1 billion gallons was 
scaled back to 14 million gallons (ethanol equivalent) (Schnepf and Yacobucci, 2013: 3). The 
situation for 2014 is discussed further below. In the EU, with no intermediate targets, the 
same comparison cannot be made. That said, for various reasons a number of aspects of the 
EU mandate is up for reform. Again, we return to this later. 
 
With the lack of advanced biofuels delivered to market thus far, attention has been paid 
primarily at efforts to contain the potential downsides of first generation biofuels. These are 
linked primarily to the climate change policy driver. These potential downsides were known 
about at the time the RED and EISA were being prepared because provision is made, in 
different ways, to try to accommodate them. First, there are a range of issues that relate 
directly to the GHG emissions performance of biofuels, notably in terms of the production 
conditions of the primary feedstock. These were dealt with through the adoption of 
‘sustainability criteria’. In both of our cases, these come in two parts, minimum GHG 
emissions reductions required for biofuels to count against the mandate (and thus be eligible 
for financial incentives such as tax breaks), followed by specific criteria on feedstock types 
and/or production conditions. 
 
In the EU, biofuels must deliver GHG emissions reductions over fossil fuels – of at least 35% 
initially (or from 2013 if the production facility was operating before 2008); and at least 50% 
from 2017. From 2018, biofuels produced in plants which began production in 2017 must 
deliver savings of at least 60%. There then follow a series of exclusionary criteria. Biofuels 
cannot be produced on certain types of land, to preserve biodiversity (such as primary forests, 
land protected by law, and highly biodiverse grassland). Also, biofuels cannot be produced on 
certain types of land, the cultivation of which will release carbon stored therein (wetlands, 
continuously forested area, and undrained peatland). 
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In the US, the EISA requires a life-cycle GHG emissions reduction of 20% for ‘standard’ 
renewables compared with the fossil fuels they replace, 50% for ‘advanced biofuel’ and for 
‘biomass-based diesel’, and 60% for ‘cellulosic biofuel’. Unlike the EU, in the US older 
ethanol plants are grandfathered. The sustainability criteria are then specified in terms of 
inclusionary conditions which, together, constitute the definition of ‘renewable biomass’. 
Crops, trees and residues thereof can be used if the land was already actively managed before 
19 December 2007 (as with the EU criterion, to avoid releasing carbon by bringing land into 
agricultural production). Also eligible is animal waste and byproducts, yard waste and food 
waste. Biomass cleared from near buildings or in areas at risk of wildfire can be utilised, as 
can slash and thinnings from non-federal forestlands, so long as those forests are not 
imperilled or rare (again, like the EU, preserving biodiversity). Unlike the EU, the US also 
explicitly identifies algae, a third generation biofuel feedstock. 
 
It is beyond the scope of the present paper to go into detail about how life-cycle (‘paddock to 
pump’) GHG emissions are calculated. An important point to note, however, is that 
understanding of the demands of these estimations has evolved over time.2 This applies to the 
values incorporated into emissions models – but, critically, it also involves a developing 
understanding of which variables to include. The example of this, par excellence, is land use 
change (LUC), especially indirect land use change (ILUC). The idea behind ILUC is that if 
agricultural feedstocks are switched from food to biofuel end-uses, this will put upward 
pressure on agricultural and food prices. This, in turn, will induce other farmers (who could 
be located anywhere in the world) to respond by diverting land into the production of these 
higher-priced commodities. This, the argument goes, has resulted from biofuels production 
and therefore the emissions impact of ILUC, of bringing that land around the world into the 
production of the given commodity, should be attributed to the biofuel triggering it. 
 
The problems with this are, however, manifold. Central to this is the fact that ILUC cannot be 
observed directly, only estimated by economic modelling. This immediately creates space for 
uncertainty and contestation. Interviews in Washington DC (and Brasilia) revealed great 
scepticism amongst policy-makers over the very existence of ILUC on any scale. The 
economic challenges of modelling are extensive. Assumptions must be made about the 
                                                 
2 Author correspondence with one of the leading researchers in this field. 
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impact of a given volume of feedstock on domestic prices, thence on international prices, 
then on farmers’ production decisions across the globe, whilst also trying to isolate the 
impacts of biofuels from all of the other factors (for more on ILUC modelling see, inter alia, 
Bouët et al., 2010; Edwards et al., 2010, and the references contained therein). 
 
Second there is the impact that the use of food crops for biofuels could have on food prices. 
Thus, for example, the limit on conventional biofuels in the RFS was set at 15 billion gallons 
because, as several interviews with policy-makers and civil servants confirmed, this was seen 
as the maximum that could be delivered without corn markets being affected significantly 
(although our interviewees failed to agree on who actually came up with that precise figure, 
with at least three candidate bodies being mentioned). In terms of a biofuels policy 
supporting agriculture, this figure is also significant as it, effectively, represents an ethanol 
volume ring-fenced for US corn producers. This is the case de facto, even though it is not so, 
de jure. Furthermore, by effectively classifying the main source of ethanol from the world’s 
second largest producer, Brazil, as ‘advanced’, it effectively allocates different parts of the 
RFS to the two biggest ethanol producers. 
 
The 15 billion gallon figure raises another issue of profound importance for US policy: the 
blend wall. Because the US biofuels mandate is expressed in terms of an absolute volume, 
what matters is not only the volume of biofuels to be blended into fossil fuels, but also the 
volume of fossil fuels into which biofuels can be blended. This applies in particular for the 
dominant form of fuel in the US – petrol/gasoline. This is because (unlike biodiesel, a 
minority fuel in the US), standard internal combustion engines can only function normally on 
relatively low ethanol blends, before adaptations are required. That said, there is no 
agreement on what this blend actually is. Formal US policy is two-tiered – a 10% blend for 
older vehicles (‘E10’), but a 15% blend for newer vehicles (‘E15’). Meanwhile, petrol sold in 
Brazil is typically E25 (sometimes reduced to E20, depending on market conditions). Brazil’s 
domestically-produced vehicles are flex-fuel and have thus been adapted to accommodate 
any petrol-ethanol blend, but increasing wealth has seen increasing imports of (usually more 
expensive) vehicles, all of which have to run on the E20 or E25. 
 
In the US, however, the demand for petrol has not grown as forecast when the EISA was 
agreed. As a result, the petrol market is very close to the blend wall, at which point, no more 
ethanol can be blended into petrol. One solution is to fit vehicles with flex-fuel engines, but 
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this faces two constraints: there are not enough of these to move back the blend wall very far; 
combined with a fuel distribution infrastructure not well-adapted to supplying a completely 
new type of fuel. This creates an interesting dynamic for US policy. At the blend wall, 
demand is very roughly equal to the RFS mandate for first generation (principally 
domestically-produced corn-based) ethanol. Beyond this, production of ‘advanced’ and 
cellulosic ethanol is limited, but so is the scope for blending much more ethanol into fuel. 
 
In this sub-section we have outlined a number of key policy issues, related principally  to the 
climate change mitigation driver of biofuels policy, which might represent points of policy 
failure. As noted right at the start, however, the issue of time is extremely important in such 
an analysis. Thus we bring our analysis below up to date by looking not only at points of 
historical interest, but also at the current debates over policy developments. Specifically, the 
EU has had a proposal for reform of the RED (and related legislation) on the table since 
October 2012; whilst the US has seen a great deal of politicking over what the EPA is going 
to lay down as its final rule for the RFS targets in 2014. This will help bring some of the 
earlier policy features into sharp relief. 
 
3. Biofuels Policies: Where Might Failure Arise? 
A key feature of biofuels policies, as noted above, is the bifurcation of policy between 
containment of the potential downsides of first generation biofuels, and supporting the 
development and commercialisation of advanced biofuels. This, of itself, is not policy failure. 
Indeed, given the fact that the three policy drivers embrace different, even incommensurable, 
values, a biofuels policy which promotes both first and second generation biofuels can, if not 
reconcile these differences, help hold together a diverse pro-biofuels coalition. Thus if policy 
failure does exist, it will be within one or both of these policy dimensions. First, it is worth 
noting that energy security can be satisfied by any biofuel, of any generation. Rural 
development is a contested concept, but in the US, where interviews confirmed ethanol 
policy is partly a policy for ‘Big Ag’, such a policy will only deliver via first generation 
biofuels. Broader notions of rural development, however, can be satisfied by advanced, as 
well as first generation, biofuels. 
 
With the climate change driver of biofuels policies, we need to return to the Brazilian 
biofuels ‘mantra’ stated earlier. Specifically, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol is ‘a first generation 
biofuel with advanced biofuel performance’ (a quote from a senior civil servant in Brasilia in 
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2010, one of Brazil’s most senior officials working on biofuels at that time). In most other 
cases, however, first generation biofuels deliver rather less spectacular GHG emissions 
reductions relative to fossil fuels. Indeed, ‘biofuels done [very] badly’ can even deliver 
higher emissions than fossil fuels. 
 
The question then becomes, how successful have the two parts of biofuels policy (promoting 
advanced biofuels whilst seeking to contain the potential downsides of first generation 
biofuels) actually been? In the last decade, as the production and use of first generation 
biofuels has expanded rapidly in the EU and US, so too has opposition grown to these 
biofuels. Meanwhile, the continued failure to deliver more than a trickle of second generation 
biofuels to market has also led to opposition – in particular in the US, where separate 
mandates expose this failure most clearly. Thus both dimensions of policy are under threat 
from different directions. 
 
EU policy has been challenged, and the policy process disrupted, in significant ways. This 
has manifested itself increasingly as the consequences of policy – the expanded production, 
import and use of biofuels – have become more apparent. As stated earlier, the downsides of 
first generation biofuels, such as possible food-price effects, and multiple land-use change 
issues, were known prior to 2007 – hence reference to such concerns in the EISA and, albeit 
structured differently, in the RED. The EU policy response, reflecting the time taken by the 
salami slicing approach, has ended up lagging behind the wider debate over biofuels and their 
downsides. Moreover, given the global reach of biofuels supply chains, this debate has been 
focused on EU policy far more than US policy. 
 
For example, in February 2010 the EU was in the process of negotiating the detailed 
proposals for implementing legislation regarding the sustainability criteria. This process was 
disrupted when Friends of the Earth Europe leaked a draft version which suggested palm oil 
plantations could potentially replace rainforests and still count as a sustainable source of palm 
oil for biodiesel. Given widespread concerns about oil palm, deforestation and habitat loss, 
such a measure inevitably attracted a great deal of attention. In the end, this element did not 
appear in the final version. Relatedly, the EU faces a very different challenge, in that demand 
for palm oil for food uses is growing rapidly – thus (as noted earlier) disentangling the 
consequences of biofuels and of food for the expansion of oil palm plantations is a very 
challenging exercise. Even a highly-location-specific ground level study may give misleading 
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information, if the product from a given plantation is sent to different buyers, for different 
end uses, over time. 
 
The EU process for implementing sustainability criteria includes utilising existing 
independent (non-state) bodies as authorised providers of standards certification. Actors such 
Bonsucro (for sugarcane, formerly the Better Sugarcane Initiative) and the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), have submitted their certification schemes to the European 
Commission, who judge the certification standard against the EU criteria. Once approved, all 
biofuels carrying that certification are deemed to conform to EU standards.3 One challenge 
has been that this process is very time consuming, as a result of which, in the early years a 
significant proportion of biofuels utilised in the EU had not been certified as sustainable. On 
the other hand, this is a dynamic situation. For example, in the UK, 31% of biofuels were 
certified in 2009-10, rising to 53% in 2010-11. The latest estimates for 2013-144 indicate the 
figure is now 98%. Meanwhile, given the significance of the potential environmental and 
emissions damage that can be caused by oil palm, it is interesting to note that, in 2012, a 
news item on the Jakarta Post website5 reported ‘that EU countries were showing a 
commitment to switch to [certified sustainable palm oil] by 2015.’ Thus whilst EU countries 
will continue to import uncertified palm oil until at least 2015, the issue of whether this 
represents a policy failure is a different matter. 
 
A related disruption to EU policy has been debate over land-use change, especially ILUC, 
and its role in etimating the life-cycle emissions of biofuels (again, given the principally 
domestic focus of US policy, this has been a feature mainly of EU policy discourse). 
Interviews in both Brussels and Washington revealed that it was with the publication of 
Searchinger et al. (2008) that opposition to biofuels on the basis of ILUC effects took off. In 
particular, environmental NGOs were concerned that, outside of the bounds defined by 
sustainability criteria (which only cover direct land use changes), biofuels would indirectly 
impact on emissions and biodiversity. 
 
                                                 
3 For details see http://ec.europa.eu/energy/renewables/biofuels/sustainability_schemes_en.htm (last accessed 4 
February 2014). 
4 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/255318/rtfo-2013-14-year-6-
report-1.pdf 
5 ‘Musim Mas expects more demand for certified palm oil’, 17 July 2012, accessed 19 July 2012. 
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As an idea, ILUC gained a lot of traction very quickly with anti-biofuels NGOs, both those 
concerned with the environment and, often for different reasons, development NGOs. 
Interviews in Brussels confirmed that Professor Searchinger gave a seminar in Brussels in 
early 2008 about this research – and one interviewee, a policy insider within the Commission, 
was astonished that this research, and the concept of ILUC, had no impact on the RED. On 
the other hand, one could argue that it was scheduled to be in the third policy salami slice: 
after the RED and the detailed implementing legislation for the sustainability criteria came 
discussion over how to address land-use changes in GHG emissions calculations. Eventually 
emerging months later than planned, this is part of the proposed legislative reforms that, in 
early 2014, remain on the table. 
 
One aspect of US policy is worth particular note. Most biofuel used in the US is domestically 
produced ethanol, derived from domestically produced corn. This, however, delivers a 
relatively modest GHG emissions saving relative to fossil fuel – indeed, a saving that is 
insufficient for the thresholds laid down by the California Air Resources Board (CARB). As 
a result, Brazilian sugarcane ethanol has been imported into California. Meanwhile, in recent 
years Brazil has suffered a range of problems which has hit domestic ethanol availability, 
including poor cane harvests and high sugar prices. As a result, in order to maintain at least a 
20% ethanol blend in petrol, US corn ethanol has had to be imported. This circular trade 
improves the net emissions performance of California’s fuel, reduces the net emissions 
performance of Brazil’s fuel, creates emissions from transporting the fuel (which, currently, 
is not part of any emissions calculation), and has led to a lot of mockery. Whether or not this 
trade and its consequences constitutes policy failure is unclear, but it certainly represents sub-
optimal policy performance. It may not conform to the formal definition of a ‘policy fiasco’ 
outlined later, but the word fiasco is apposite, nonetheless. 
 
Another important aspect of sustainability criteria is what they do not contain. Key omissions 
were made, in large measure, as a result of concerns over the WTO compatibility of the 
criteria (so-called ‘regulatory chill – see Lydgate, 2012). It is beyond the scope of the present 
article to consider this issue in detail (see, inter alia, Ackrill and Kay, 2011, and the 
references contained therein). Within the EU, there was debate over the possible inclusion of 
social sustainability and labour standards in the sustainability criteria. In the end, interviews 
within the Commission revealed that although the European Parliament was in favour, the 
decision was taken to omit them: there was concern that their inclusion would cross some 
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countries’ ‘red lines’, risking an action being brought in the WTO that could threaten the 
whole biofuels policy. Instead, a process was introduced that the Commission would report 
every two years on the implementation and impact of EU biofuels policy, including specific 
elements addressing these concerns. 
 
The reporting process is also required to address the impact of biofuels production on 
agricultural commodity prices and (especially) on food prices. As with ILUC, estimating the 
effects of biofuels production on food prices is no easy matter. One piece of informal 
evidence was seen in the US in 2008 and 2009. 2008 was a year when the prices of many 
food commodities spiked globally. In the US, bodies such as the Grocery Manufacturers 
Association (GMA) highlighted the rise in corn going to produce biofuels, the rise in biofuels 
production, and the rise in corn-related food prices in that year. In 2009, the amount of corn 
going to biofuels continued to rise, as indeed did that volume expressed as a share of the total 
corn crop, yet commodity and food prices fell back again. Informal conversations in the US 
suggest that the lobbying against biofuels (from organisations such as the GMA) tends to 
fluctuate with food prices, rather than biofuels production. A further challenge facing US 
policy that the broader fiscal debate may pose a major threat to biofuels policies (Chite, 2012: 
46). He also suggests (on page 47) that the food versus fuel debate could impact significantly 
on US biofuels policy going forward (bearing in mind also the failure to deliver significant 
volumes of cellulosic ethanol). 
 
In the EU, whilst the reporting process includes monitoring the possible food price impacts of 
biofuels, policymakers have been reticent to accept a causal link. With debate still at the level 
of ideas and with information over the magnitude of links still strongly contested, there has so 
far been no policy shift. Indeed, this applies to all of the pressures on policy discussed in this 
section. In short, despite the economic connections binding biofuels to multiple markets and 
to multiple arenas of policy debate and contestation, including those which suggest that 
biofuels policies, in some sense, are not working, biofuels policies remain unaltered. 
 
[Comments please on this, especially with reference to any of the policy failure literature I 
may have missed!] 
 
We turn now to the current pressures faced by our two cases. Legislative proposals for reform 
of the EU biofuels policy were tabled in October 2012 (European Commission, 2012). The 
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proposed approach to dealing with ILUC is to introduce a series of flat-rate ILUC factors into 
the GHG emissions calculations, distinguished by (first-generation biofuel) feedstock group 
and expressed as grams of CO2-equivalent per megajoule of biofuel energy: 12 for cereals 
and other starch-rich crops, 13 for sugars and 55 for oil crops. To avoid double-counting and 
double-penalties, feedstock production which gives rise to direct land-use change is to be 
excluded from ILUC-related emissions. 
 
A second element of the proposals involves altering the timing of changes to minimum GHG 
emissions thresholds. It is proposed that whilst new bio-refineries will have to deliver a 60% 
GHG emissions reduction sooner (this applies to plants starting operating from 1 July 2014, 
compared with 1 January 2017 previously), those refineries in operation on or before 1 July 
2014 would now have an a full extra year, until 1 January 2018, to deliver a 50% GHG 
emissions reduction (albeit including the new ILUC-factor). 
 
A third element is the proposal to place a cap on the share of the renewable fuel mandate that 
can come from first generation biofuels. The proposal is 5%, roughly equal to the actual share 
of first generation biofuels in total transport fuel in 2012. The 10% overall target remains, 
with some advanced biofuels now to count four times towards that target rather than twice. 
Thus there are further efforts to encourage the development and commercial production of 
advanced biofuels, with part of the biofuels mandate now given over explicitly to them. That 
said, in conversations with leading figures from fuel companies, we were told that these 
proposals would have no impact on encouraging the development of advanced biofuels, 
because they provided no guarantees regarding returns on any investment. 
 
Negotiations on these proposals ended in December 2013, with an expectation that discussion 
would not resume until late 2014 or 2015. Thus the (possible) introduction of an ILUC factor 
have been delayed; and the changes to GHG emissions threshold minima will, with the delay 
in agreeing reforms, be at most only marginally different to the existing policy. The state of 
negotiations in 2013 suggested a compromise figure of a 7% share of first generation biofuels 
in the total renewable target was a plausible compromise outcome – which is unlikely to be 
significantly below what is possible by 2020 anyway. 
 
In the US, pressure has been building on the RFS in recent years, via the EPAs annual final 
rule-making on (revised) annual targets for different types of biofuel, especially cellulosic 
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ethanol. As noted above, the target was even set aside in 2012, following a Washington court 
ruling which agreed with the American Petroleum Institute, a prominent oil industry lobby 
group, that the EPA mandates were ‘unreasonable’. Whilst this has, thus far, had no lasting 
effect on the RFS and the decisions taken by the EPA, in the latter part of 2013 the EPA 
changed its framing of the issue, to one based on the blend wall and the ability of the market 
to accommodate more ethanol. Thus the focus has shifted from the supply of ethanol to the 
effective demand for ethanol. This provided the backdrop to the EPA’s proposed rule for 
2014, published in November 2013. This seeks cuts to all but one element of the RFS in 2014 
(all figures in billion gallons, taken from an article on the Biofuels Digest website)6: 
cellulosic ethanol (1.75 to 0.017), advanced biofuel (3.75 to 2.2), corn ethanol (14.4 to 
13.01), thus renewable fuel (18.15 to 15.21), plus biodiesel (1 to 1.28). Advanced biofuels are 
thus threatened with a 41.33% cut, corn ethanol with a 9.7% cut. 
 
EPA discourse may have switched to the blend wall, but supporters of biofuels argue that the 
blend wall was known about in 2007,and that the expectation was that the fuel industry would 
do something about it: they have not done so and seemingly are now being rewarded for it (in 
the eyes of those biofuels supporters). Brent Erickson has put the issue thus: ‘The RFS was 
intended not to codify that only ten percent of transportation fuel be biofuel, but instead to 
actually help break through the blend wall by incentivizing investments in higher blends of 
ethanol, drop-ins, and biodiesel as well as new advanced biofuels – and it has been working 
as intended.’7 
 
It is also suggested (in the 17 November Biofuels Digest article) that, for reasons related to 
the rising cost of purchasing Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs), central to tracking 
the renewable element of transport fuels, the oil industry could get White House support for 
backtracking on the RFS by pointing to the impact of rising RIN prices on petrol prices for 
                                                 
6 These data, and the rest of this discussion, are taken primarily from ‘Obama Messes with the RFS’, an article 
published online on Biofuels Digest on 17 November 2013 and accessed on 18 November 2013: 
http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2013/11/17/obama-messes-with-the-rfs/ 
7 Brent Erickson is Executive VP and head of the Industrial and Environmental section at the Biotechnology 
Industry Organization. This quote come from an article entitled ‘EPS’s Christmas Gift to the Oil Refiners’, 
Biofuel Digest, 29 December 2013: http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2013/12/29/epas-christmas-gift-to-
the-oil-refiners/ (accessed 6 January 2014). 
20 
 
consumers. A separate article on Biofuels Digest8 argues that there is a deliberate policy of 
over-charging for E85 (comparing ethanol and gasoline price spreads on wholesale and retail 
markets), reducing demand and thus adding to the blend wall constraint. 
 
4. Biofuels Policies: Policy Failure, Policy Success, or Work-in-Progress? 
4.1 Policy Failure – a Review of Key Issues 
A policy, for our purposes, involves a public body putting in place a series of measures, laws, 
guidelines, instruments, etc., to achieve certain goals, or outcomes. In principle, the notion of 
policy success or failure is very simple – has the policy delivered what was intended or not? 
As with most concepts, however, this is also deceptively simple. The notion of the policy 
cycle indicates different points in the life-cycle of a policy at which a success/failure 
judgement could be made. This is summarised in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Policy Cycles and Policy Failure 
Agenda setting Over-reaching governments establishing or agreeing to establish overburdened or 
unattainable policy agendas 
Policy formulation Attempting to deal with problems without investigating or researching problem 
causes and identifying the probable effects of policy alternatives 
Decision-making Failing to decide on a policy within a reasonable period of time or distorting its intent 
through bargaining  and log-rolling 
Policy implementation Failing to deal with implementation problems including lack of resources, principal-
agent problems, oversight failure, and others 
Policy evaluation Lack of learning as a result of a lack of, ineffective, or inappropriate policy 
monitoring and/or feedback processes and structures 
Source: Howlett, 2012: 547. 
 
Further, Howlett identifies four types of policy failure (Table 3). To this can be added the 
work of McConnell, 2010. Layered on top of the notions of types of failures is the idea that 
failure and success exist on a spectrum. Indeed, McConnell argues they exist in three spectra 
– policy as process, as programme and as politics. This gives us a nuanced toolkit with which 
to approach the question of policy failure. Even so, we also need to add time into the mix. A 
policy takes time to develop, it may be implemented a bit at a time (through salami slicing), it 
may be intended to operate over a defined time-period, with implicit or explicit goals, it may 
                                                 
8 http://www.biofuelsdigest.com/bdigest/2013/12/04/stand-by-me-renewable-fuels-defenders-pull-out-the-stops-
to-persuade-epa-to-continue-the-war-on-imported-oil/ (accessed 5 December 2013). 
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be time-limited but with the intention that the initial policy matrix establishes an ongoing or 
open-ended commitment to a particular policy and its related outcomes. 
 
Table 3: Four Types of Policy Failure 
Policy accidents Good plans are not executed properly 
Policy mistakes Good execution is wasted on poorly developed plans 
Policy fiascos Poor planning and poor execution lead to very poor results 
Policy anomalies The most rigorous analysis and execution still did not result in the achievement of goals, 
against all reasonable expectations given an existing policy paradigm 
Howlett, 2012: 551. 
 
The foregoing introduction to the notion of policy failure will prove useful to us, but we must 
also consider a key additional factor – if any policy or element of policy is deemed to have 
failed, why might that be? We shall embed this discussion in what follows. 
 
[Is there a glaring omission of literature here in terms of policy failure and time?] 
 
4.2: Failure, Success, or Work-in-Progress? 
Both policy cases have come under growing scrutiny and pressure over time. Both are, as I 
write, facing uncertainties over the future speed and direction of travel. Yet currently, there is 
no sign of biofuels being abandoned totally by policy-makers. We thus need to dig deeper in 
order to determine where, if at all, failure has occurred, is occurring, or may occur in the 
coming years. First, the EU. 
 
EU policy lays down a rising volume and share of biofuels to be blended into transport fuel 
by 2020. This appears to be happening, although Eurostat data are only available currently up 
to 2011, in which year some countries experienced a sharp decline, pulling down the EU27 
figure from 4.8% to 3.8%. At a more disaggregated level, climate change mitigation as a 
critical driver for EU policy has led to significant debate and attempted disruption: it also 
underpinned the current reform proposals. That said, this disruption was not sufficient to 
force the member states to agree a reform in December 2013. Disagreements remained over 
the cap on first generation biofuels, with countries such as Belgium and Denmark saying the 
7% figure was too high, countries such as Poland and Hungary arguing the opposite. In 
theory, the introduction of the ILUC factor may impact on the GHG emissions performance 
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of EU-consumed biofuels, but this will occur (by definition) only at the margin – and in the 
light of the increase in GHG emissions thresholds, (whether on the original schedule or that 
set out in the reform proposals) this is expected to have only a modest impact on the EU 
biofuels market. 
 
Where EU policy is facing greater difficulty is in the lack of development of advanced 
(especially second generation) biofuels. Whilst the US had annual targets laid down in the 
RFS, all the EU has is advanced biofuels counting double towards the mandate and, towards 
the end of the timeframe to 2020, an increase in the GHG emissions threshold that, inter alia, 
is intended as an incentive for the development of commercial-scale advanced biofuels. This 
has not happened (the use of recycled cooking oil and the like has made a contribution, but 
data limitations prevent further analysis). Moreover, there is no evidence that significant 
volumes of second generation biofuels are likely to be forthcoming in the next few years – 
and certainly not in time for the 2017 increase in thresholds. Thus, barring miraculous 
progress, we can argue that even though we are several years away from 2020, this is an 
appropriate time to be looking at policy in terms of success or failure. 
 
Given the failure of companies to commercialise second generation biofuels, how can this be 
categorised? One possible reading is that this is a principal-agent failure (policy 
implementation), whereby the policy-makers failed to ensure the private companies did what 
was expected of them. Alternatively, it could be seen as a failure of policy formulation, 
insofar as it failed to take full account of the challenges (private sector) companies faced in 
delivering the desired outcomes. If so, this would happen notwithstanding the efforts of the 
European Commission to work with and provide financial and technical support to companies 
in this development process. Interviews support the thesis that policy-makers recognised the 
challenging nature of the ambitions for advanced biofuels, but that the measures were deemed 
sufficient to ensure the private sector delivered. 
 
The timing of the reform proposal is explained easily enough – the RED included provision 
for review of the biofuels market (including such concerns as the possible impact of biofuels 
on food prices) in 2012. Therefore the proposals can be seen as policy evaluation and policy 
learning. What is contested is whether or not those measures as proposed are sufficient to 
overcome the perceived downsides on first generation biofuels. Even so, we must not be too 
hasty in judging this as possible failure. Successive reforms of the Common Agricultural 
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Policy have demonstrated that as a result of EU structures and policy processes, policy 
reform can be incremental and take a long time. But as the recent reform of the sugar policy 
shows particularly well (see, inter alia, Ackrill and Kay, 2009), the Commission possesses 
sufficient determination to get the policy where it wants it to be…eventually. 
 
What is worrying about the reform proposals is that they appear to offer nothing substantively 
new in terms of policy instruments. If offering double-counting advanced biofuels against the 
mandate has not encouraged firms to overcome the technical and economic difficulties they 
face, providing for quadruple-counting is unlike to work either. This suggests a severe 
shortcoming in ‘reflection capacity’ (Ackrill and Kay, 2012), whereby policy challenges 
faced as a result of difficulties on the road to the long-term superordinate policy goal are 
responded to by reflecting on what might have gone wrong, why, and how policy can be 
changed to correct the problem and return the policy to its original long-term path. The 
Danish Minister for Climate, Energy and Buildings argued that, with the ceiling on first 
generation biofuels, a sub-target for advanced biofuels would spur the production and 
delivery of advanced biofuels. This element, however, would add little to the ‘failed’ EU 
policy on advanced biofuels thus far, and also ignores the fact that US policy, which includes 
explicit sub-targets for advanced biofuels, has also failed to deliver those advanced biofuels. 
Indeed, private conversations with a leading figure in the UK renewable fuel sector revealed 
that a number of EU-based firms are looking to the US for support in developing advanced 
biofuels, as they believe it is more supportive. 
 
Considering Table 3 above, a generous reading might see this as a policy anomaly, insofar as 
the existing policy paradigm (in the EU and US) was that mandates would suffice to get 
private companies to respond with advanced biofuels; but, unexpectedly, this did not happen. 
More like this is a policy mistake: the policy has been implemented correctly – indeed, as 
noted, the Commission continues to support firms in the development efforts – but what is 
being implemented is a policy which was over-ambitious in terms of what the private sector 
could – literally and metaphorically – deliver. 
 
Has, though, the EU policy delivered on its climate change goal? It would take several papers 
to answer this with any degree of comprehensiveness. Suffice it to say briefly here, the latest 
UK report on its efforts estimates that the biofuels used in the UK have, excluding ILUC, 
reduced emissions by 70% relative to fossil fuels. Moreover, as noted above, in the latest year 
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98% of biofuels were certified sustainable. On the other hand, data limitations prevent a 
comparable commentary on other EU member states, whilst doubts remain over the efficacy 
of the certification process. Oil palm plantations, in particular, continue to give cause for 
considerable concern amongst development and environmental NGOs. This does, however, 
return us to the earlier debate over the challenges faced in estimating the environmental and 
economic impacts of biofuels when there are so many other factors simultaneously impacting 
on those same variables. Overall, there is no clear evidence of the original pro-biofuels 
coalition breaking up. What has happened is that, with concern in particular over food prices 
and the environment (for example via ILUC), more voices have joined the anti-biofuels 
coalition. Even so this pressure, which reflects international concerns, has failed to bring 
sufficient pressure to fracture the pro-biofuels coalition and influence domestic policy-makers 
to bring about significant reform – or even, we would argue, proposals that represent 
significant reform. 
 
In the US, given the primarily domestic nature of US biofuels policy, the main pressures are 
internal. One key challenge is, like the EU, the failure to deliver significant volumes of 
advanced biofuels to market. To this one can apply the same logic, arguments and assessment 
to US policy as to EU policy. The blend wall, however, offers both a complex issue and one 
not faced by the EU. From the outset, a central question that arose from our fieldwork was 
how on earth 36 billion gallons could be accommodated in the US transport fuel mix. The 
earlier excerpts from the Biofuels Digest suggest one clear line of thought from the pro-
biofuels lobby – a principal-agent failure in policy implementation, where they argue the 
government has failed to ensure the oil and fuel interests delivered on what was required to 
break through the blend wall. The earlier quote from Brent Erickson makes interesting 
reading in this light. First, he argues that, the lack of cellulosic ethanol notwithstanding, 
delivered volumes of advanced biofuels generally have been rising. This, as he says, ‘has 
been working as intended’. The problems, therefore, are located towards the downstream end 
of the fuel supply chain, in distribution and retail. In addition, there is the car industry. They 
have been loathe to issue warranties on vehicles with petrol blended above E10, with much 
EPA testing prior to the green light given for E15 – and then only on newer vehicles. Flex 
fuel vehicles are available, meanwhile, but the availability of E85 has been limited. 
 
As a result, there is no single point of failure regarding the continuing presence of the blend 
wall. Problems can be seen in terms of principal-agent concerns relationships between the 
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government and both the fuel companies and car makers. That said, there is also a policy 
anomaly at work: when the EISA was being put together it was, quite reasonably, assumed 
that demand for transport fuel would continue growing. This would provide a larger absolute 
volume of fossil-fuel into which could be blended a larger absolute volume of biofuel. Even 
though financial markets in the US, via sub-prime mortgage markets, were starting to look 
wobbly, only very few economists were predicting the catastrophe to come in 2006/07. 
Calling that an anomaly seems something of an understatement! 
 
The current state of play in US policy is that it is facing a critical juncture. The blend wall is, 
without question, presenting a fundamental challenge to the future of US biofuels policy – 
and that is the present reality, regardless of where the ‘blame’ lies. As it has presented an 
increasingly binding constraint, not only has the EPA deepened the cuts in its annual final 
rules on the RFS to reflect these constraints; it has also realigned its rhetoric with the blend 
wall issue. As such, its position has come to mirror ever more closely that of the anti-biofuels 
interests within Big Oil and the fuel companies. 
 
This brings us to perhaps the most intriguing aspect of US biofuels policy. The big push for 
biofuels in the US was led by (Republican) President, George W Bush, from an oil state 
(Texas). It now appears to be under threat from a (Democratic) President, Barack Obama, 
from a corn-belt state (Illinois). Part of the explanation for this paradox can be found in the 
leading driver of US policy – energy security. After 2001 President Bush, in successive State 
of the Union addresses, identified biofuels as a way of helping improve energy (oil) security 
and reducing oil imports – ramping this up over time to the point where it led directly into the 
mandate laid down in the EISA and the RFS. 
 
What he could not have foreseen was the shale revolution. Shale oil and gas have, in little 
more than a couple of years, transformed the energy matrix in the US. Moreover, this new 
source of energy is relatively cheap; and it does not come with the associated bureaucracy of, 
for example, RINs attached to biofuels. Not surprisingly, therefore, the oil and fuel industries 
have responded completely differently to this than to biofuels and the RFS. In the last three 
State of the Union addresses, President Obama has been making fewer and fewer references 
to ‘energy’. His references to energy security are now linked to shale deposits, and when 
discussing renewables, he names wind and/or solar, but not biofuels. 
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US policy is therefore facing a number of challenges. The structure of the RFS and the 
current provisional EPA rule for 2014 is looking to cut slightly the conventional ethanol 
element that is, in effect, ring-fenced for US corn ethanol. This, and the accompanying cuts to 
the various elements of advanced ethanol, have been justified on the basis of the blend wall. 
Only biodiesel, a totally different product and one not subject to a blend wall, looks likely to 
be allowed to expand. Given the failure to ensure the technical developments were delivered 
that could dismantle, or at least move, the blend wall, the EPAs decision looks to the pro-
biofuels lobby like supporting the position taken by the fuel and car industries. Perhaps more 
seriously in the longer term, it risks creating significant tensions between corn/first 
generation ethanol interests and advanced ethanol interests. This could split the pro-biofuels 
coalition, possibly cementing the corn ethanol element but risking the long term future of the 
advanced ethanol industry. 
 
The position of corn ethanol in this is particularly interesting, given that US ethanol policy 
has also been driven strongly by Big Ag. The blend wall, total petrol demand and the 
structure of the RFS always made it likely that the domestic market would settle into an 
equilibrium where the capacity for blending ethanol into petrol would be roughly equal to 
(capped) supplies of corn ethanol. The EPAs planned cut for conventional ethanol in 2014 is 
relatively modest. As such, the agricultural/ethanol lobby might be fighting a second best 
argument in a zero-sum game – that since the blend wall has stopped the growth of the 
market for ethanol, then they will seek to defend their share of it. Given also the observation 
above of Chite, 2012, that fiscal pressures might also be brought to bear, then arguably that 
second-best position really is the best one available. What this might mean for the pro-
biofuels lobby, should first and second generation interests face themselves in conflict, is 
more problematic. With seemingly weakening support from the White House, and key 
individuals no longer in senior positions within Congress, a split in the pro-biofuels lobby 
risks major policy failure. 
 
5. (Very Preliminary) Concluding Thoughts 
Biofuels policies in both the EU and US have, in a very short space of time, turned a niche 
product into a significant element in the energy matrices of both regions. That said, both 
policies have faced difficulties and challenges. Thus far, these disruptions have not led to any 
significant policy change. In the EU, those changes that have occurred have been as a result 
of the salami slicing strategy and thus the elements of policy layered onto the original 
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legislation were planned for from the outset. Similarly, in the US the major change to date 
has come in the form of annual EPA rules on targets for different components within the RFS 
– again planned for from the outset, through the granting of this power to the EPA. Moreover, 
in the first few years of operation, these adjustments were being made to what have so far 
been the more minor elements of the RFS. 
 
By the start of 2014, however, the situation has changed significantly. In the EU a reform, 
tabled over a year ago, has been laid to one side, and is unlikely to be picked up again for a 
further year. That said, whilst this preserves the extant policy, it also ensures that the anti-
biofuels interests will continue to challenge that policy. In the US, the binding constraint of 
the blend wall has created a critical juncture for policy. How this has come to pass is 
contested, but pro-biofuels interests argue that firms in the fuel supply-chain, especially those 
at the downstream end, have created this problem by failing to act to move or break the blend 
wall as they believe was the intention behind the EISA and the RFS. Whether this has been 
done deliberately, however, is, without further evidence, moot. The policy response for 2014 
from the EPA also risks pushing the policy in such a direction that it could fragment the pro-
biofuels lobby, between first generation and advanced biofuel interests. 
 
In both cases, there are strong indications of principal-agent failures. We have seen this with 
regard to the lack of significant development of advanced biofuels on a commercial scale. In 
the US, we have also seen this with regard to the blend wall issue, and whether the pro-
biofuels lobby is correct in assertion that the original policy was predicated on the fuel and 
car industries acting to (re)move the blend wall. This point is of particular interest insofar as 
biofuels policies are a manifestation of an emerging governance challenge. In a globalising 
post-Westphalian world, policy implementation requires governments and private sector 
firms to work together. With EU biofuels policy in particular, there is also the question of 
certification, undertaken in the main by separate private sector or non-governmental bodies. 
In both cases, there has also been a need to ensure policies respect WTO rules (ie there is also 
a governance role for International Organisations in policy governance). 
 
The foregoing suggests that, within this new governance network (as distinct from hierarchy), 
a particular weakness appears to exist in the relationship between policy-makers and private 
sector firms. Specifically, private sector firms have interests which may diverge from that 
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desired of them by the policy-makers and who, without sufficient mechanisms of agency 
control, will be able to deviate from specific courses of action sought by policy-makers. 
 
But is this policy failure? Biofuels, on whatever scale, are contributing to energy security 
through diversification of energy type and source country. Biofuels are providing rural 
employment across a range of economic activities. On balance, we would argue that biofuels 
are contributing to GHG emissions reductions – although there continue to be questions about 
the GHG emissions performance of some biofuel feedstocks from some countries. What we 
can also say is that whilst both policies have failed to deliver the desired volumes to market – 
and look unlikely to deliver the volumes targeted for 2020 or 2022 – they have set the ball 
rolling on biofuels markets. 
 
Moreover, are biofuels policies suffering from silver-bullet syndrome? Only a few years ago, 
some saw biofuels as the silver bullet, the solution to energy, fuel, emissions and climate 
change concerns. Very quickly, however, the discourse changed. By the time we undertook 
fieldwork interviews in 2010 and 2011, we were regularly having people tell us ‘there is no 
silver bullet’. Instead, biofuels are now seen as one of several responses to the challenges 
faced. In the EU, formal discussions have begun on energy policy through to 2030. Here, a 
role for biofuels is still envisaged, but no explicit target is being set. In the US there may be 
challenges to the expansion of biofuels, and to the RFS as an instrument of policy, but this is 
not the same as arguing for an end to the use of biofuels. And whilst President Obama, unlike 
his predecessor no longer promotes biofuels in State of the Union addresses, he continues to 
promote renewable energy. 
 
Climate change is not going away – and biofuels will continue to be part of the policy 
response. The contribution they have made thus far is down to policies like those of the EU 
and US. Even though we can probably say now that policy will fail, in the sense that the 
2020/2022 targets will not be met, we can also argue that they have put the policy on a 
certain path. Moreover, whilst they may well miss those superordinate targets in the RED and 
EISA, those targets are themselves intermediate targets in an ongoing fight against climate 
change. The lessons these two cases give us are, first, that governance challenges in a 
globalised economy raise specific questions over agency. The biofuels cases show us this is 
especially so when policy-makers wish to develop a new market and require the cooperation, 
in many different ways, of the private sector – who have not, thus far, been inclined to work 
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towards it of their own volition. This should immediately warn policy-makers of agency 
challenges to come. 
 
Second, the biofuels cases show us that when a given policy goal is open-ended, whilst 
passage through short term (perhaps annual) targets require flexibility of management as 
progress is made towards a medium-term (decennial or so) target, so too does interpretation 
of a policy towards the long term goal of seeking to contain climate change. Keynes may 
have been right that in the long run we are all dead – but unless we are the last generation, the 
dynamics of policies and the reading of policy targets which address open-ended challenges 
need to be understood in a similarly open-ended way. Here, policy learning becomes critical, 
to ensure that any deviation from an initial policy path is not allowed to result in permanent 
deviation – even if the speed of progress has to be compromised. 
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